A drive that fails takes minutes or months to do it: heads degrade, defect lists grow, firmware trips. Four drives that disappear in the same second did not fail; they lost something in common. In a server that is a backplane slot bank, an expander that fans one SAS port out to eight drives, the cable between the controller and the backplane, or a rail of the power supply that feeds one bank. In a shelf it is an expander module or the SAS cable to the head unit. In a controller it is one channel or one port. When the shared part is restored, the drives come back, and the question is what the controller has decided in the meantime.
The controller's decision is the risk. A PERC that lost four of six members has failed the virtual disk and, when they return, sees drives whose configuration it no longer trusts and reports them foreign. A MegaRAID marks them unconfigured bad. An mdadm array marks them non-fresh if writes continued on the survivors. In every case the right move is to stop, restore the shared part with the server off, and let the bench or a careful import bring the set back with every member present. Clearing the foreign configuration to tidy the screen is the mistake that costs the most.
Solid-state drives are the exception, and a documented one. HPE's SAS SSDs on firmware before HPD8 fail at 32,768 power-on hours and another line before HPD7 at 40,000; Dell's LT-series at 40,000 before D417; HPE's NVMe drives on one firmware line at 4,700. Drives fitted together reach the hour together, and a RAID 5 of six can lose four before lunch. Those drives did die, and the free look says honestly which of them still answer at controller level.